

In Book 9 Plato finally has Socrates reply to "Glaucón's Challenge" in Book 2 with three arguments, each of which intends to prove that the life of justice is happier than that of injustice. The first argument (576b-580c) has not been evaluated so highly as the other two (580d-583a, 583b-587a) treating of pleasure, mainly because it "is scarcely an argument at all" (Cross and Woollsey, p.264; cf. Annas). Apparently this underestimation derives from the widespread view that the first argument is based *solely* on the city-soul analogy and the tripartite psychology (cf. Annas). This view is not correct, though, in that the first argument introduces as the unhappiest person the "true" tyrant (ὁ τῷ ὄντι τύραννος 579d) who is not only tyrannical in character but also becomes a tyrant in the city, which indicates that the argument goes beyond the analogical method of city and soul, considering both political and psychic elements together (cf. Ferrari, Ch.4).

In my paper, focusing on Plato's conception of the true tyrant, I aim to show that the first argument is crucial in understanding the overall structure of Books 2-9. For this aim, I start by revisiting Glaucón's democratic notion of justice in Book 2, elucidating Plato's strategy to examine it in terms of the city-soul analogy (cf. Santas). As I understand, Plato's analogical method makes use of the classical antithesis of public (δημοσία) and private (ιδία) to clarify the nature of social and psychic justice/injustice in an abstract way (λόγω).

Next, attending to the contrast between public and private, I analyze the first argument in Book 9 to argue that its persuasiveness rests on a series of philosophically pregnant metaphors, besides the city-soul analogy. In the most interesting metaphor (578d-579b), for example, Plato compares the true tyrant to a wealthy individual (ιδιώτης) who lives with his family and property, isolated from his city, while surrounded with lots of slaves and enemies. Depicting the true tyrant's life (βίος) from both public and private sides this way, Plato illuminates how unhappy he is in his concrete life as a whole.

Now Plato's characterization of the true tyrant leads us to contrast him with the philosopher-ruler amplified in the central books, who decides to return to the Cave to rule, living a public life as well as a private one. Unlike Books 2-4 and 8-9 discussing public and private separately, Books 5-7 sheds light on a *tension* between them by tackling the practicability of the ideal city and the philosopher-ruler there. Thus, presenting the two paradigmatic examples of lives (cf. τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα 618a), the first argument succeeds in persuading Glaucón (and the reader) to reflect how to live concretely in the democracy where most people mix up public and private, aspiring to be a tyrant in their heart.

REFERENCES

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