

## PROPOSAL FOR FULL/PLENARY PAPER

Christopher Rowe: 'On justice and the other virtues in the *Republic*: whose justice, whose virtues?'

Why does justice as defined in Book IV of the *Republic* play so little part *outside* the *Republic*? Anyone who thinks that each dialogue needs to be treated separately – or who thinks that the *Republic* simply represents the culmination of Plato's thinking – will not be unduly worried by such a question. However there are some indications internal to the *Republic* itself that the definition in *Republic* IV is not intended to be Plato's, Plato's Socrates', final word on justice. Even if we pass over the fact that Socrates operates with a quite different account of justice in Book I (after all, as some suppose, Book I may be just a Socratic left-over, with the remaining books announcing Plato's new-found independence), we still have to account for the fact that Socrates reminds Adimantus in Book VI (504A4-6) that the treatments of the virtues in Book IV were based on the division of the soul into three eidê – and this division of the soul was explicitly not based on the most accurate method available (IV, 435C-E). Now of course it does not follow that following another method (a 'longer and more considerable' one: 435D3) would have led to a different result. However in Book X Socrates does in fact re-open the very kind of question from which the Book IV analysis starts: does the soul, as it is in truth (611B10) have many eidê, or only one (612A4)? Once again, there is no proof that the ultimate outcome of this re-opening of the question may not actually be a *re-affirmation* of the Book IV account, perhaps in subtler and more nuanced terms; and after all, does the *Timaeus* – generally held to be written after the *Republic* – not give us precisely a Book-IV-style tripartition of the soul? Yet at the same time, the Book X passage surely *does* suggest that, if the soul is seen in abstraction from its travails in the body (and in relation to its love of wisdom: 611D8), it will look quite different; the Book IV treatment merely captured what happens to it, its pathê, and its eidê, in its life as part of that composite thing called an anthrôpos (612A4-6).

My argument is that all of this allows another version of justice, and indeed of sôphrosunê and courage, to re-surface alongside the versions introduced in Book IV: precisely justice, sôphrosunê and courage as Socrates first introduced them in Book I. And as a matter of fact Socrates himself describes the sôphrosunê and justice that the philosopher-ruler will craft in Callipolis as (merely) 'demotic' (500D6-8), I take it by contrast to his own sôphrosunê and justice, which will be of a superior, and Socratic, sort.

My initial question then turns into a different one: why should Plato and his Socrates spend so much time arguing for an idea of justice that they regard as strictly second-rate?